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THURGOOD MARSHALL'S FORLORN BATTLE AGAINST
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY:




"How about the gas chamber?"
"Now, Jake, that's why I got you. I don't plan to go to the
gas chamber. I saw you get Lester off, now you just get
me off. You can do it, Jake."
"It's not that easy, Carl Lee"
"You did with Lester."
"But every case is different. And the big difference here is
that you killed two white boys and Lester killed a
nigger. Big difference."
John Grisham, A TIME To KILL
I. INTRODUCTION
In the entire history of the American Republic, from 1789 to 2008,
only two of the 110 justices who have sat on the U.S. Supreme Court be-
lieved that state-mandated executions were both immoral and unconstitu-
tional. These jurists were William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall.
They never hesitated to write dissents when the Court denied certiorari in
death penalty cases; they always dissented when the Court majority vali-
dated the death penalty after hearing the lawyers and reading the briefs.'
When, after 1976, it became clear to them that Court majorities would
never accept their arguments that the death penalty, prima facie, was a
constitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
''cruel and unusual punishment," they then began to argue that there was
clear and unconstitutional racial discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty.
* Professor Ball is a University Scholar at the University of Vermont and a Professor at the
Vermont Law School.
1. See generally HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL & THE PERSIS-
TENCE OF RACIsM IN AMERICA (1998) for a biography of the Justice, including his views of criminal
justice and due process of law.
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McCleskey v. Kemp2 was the 1986 Term's watershed case addressing
the question of racial discrimination in death penalty sentencing. McCles-
key came to the Court in 1986, again in early 1991, and, finally, in Septem-
ber, 1991. 3 After his third petition was denied by the Court, McCleskey
was finally executed by the State of Georgia.
This paper examines the different positions taken by the justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the initial McCleskey case (the only time there were
arguments and briefs on the merits), the arguments they proffered in de-
fense of their positions in open court, and the arguments made in the
Court's secret conference sessions.
II. THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE DEATH PENALTY
For Thurgood Marshall, the death penalty was-categorically-im-
moral and unconstitutional. It was a heinous form of cruel and unusual
punishment. Setting aside the legal questions surrounding the legitimacy of
the death penalty, he believed there was an "extraordinary unfairness that
now surrounds the administration of the death penalty."4 He always voted
against the administration of the death penalty. In more than 100 death
penalty cases, Justice Marshall dissented alone or joined with Justice
Brennan.5
Until the 1976 death penalty cases, Marshall truly believed that the
death penalty was "morally unacceptable to the people of the United
States at this time in their history."'6 For Marshall, who defended African-
Americans facing the death penalty in the 1940's and 1950's, the "burden
of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, and the underprivi-
leged members of society."' 7 He wrote:
Their impotence leaves them victims of a sanction that the
wealthier, better-represented, just-as-guilty person can es-
cape. . . . Legislators are content to maintain the status
quo .... Assuming knowledge of all the facts, the average
citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his con-
science and sense of justice. For this reason alone, capital
punishment cannot stand.8
After seeing that 35 states continued to validate capital punishment-
through newly created legislation passed after the 1972 Furman decision,
2. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
3. McCleskey v. Zant, 501 U.S. 1224 (1991).
4. Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress.
5. BALL, supra note 1, at 304.
6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
7. BALL, supra note 1, at 304.
8. Furman, 408 U.S. at 366, 369 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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which invalidated the death penalty as then practiced in the states-Mar-
shall then set out to educate the American public about both the immoral-
ity and the unfairness of the death penalty.9
III. LEWIS F. POWELL: THURGOOD'S NEMESIS ON THE COURT
Lewis F. Powell, was a reed-slim attorney from Richmond, Virginia,
who became an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in late 1971.
After repeated and insistent requests from President Richard M. Nixon
and his Attorney General John Mitchell, Powell reluctantly1" took the seat
vacated when a great jurist, Hugo L. Black of Alabama, was forced to re-
tire because of poor health. 1 Given the split on the Court for most of his
tenure (1971-1987), Powell often found himself the key swing justice on the
majority side of controversial 5:4 Court decisions in affirmative action, per-
sonal privacy, and criminal justice cases.1
2
In the 1986 Term, Powell once again found himself the fifth justice in a
critically important case that challenged the fairness of Georgia's capital
sentencing processes. Once again, Powell was asked to write the opinion of
the Court validating Georgia's implementation of the death penalty. And
once again, regarding McCleskey, after Powell left the Court, he changed
his mind and publicly acknowledged that he was wrong in both cases.
13
McCleskey as precedent has made it impossible for lawyers for condemned
prisoners to employ statistics to show that the capital sentencing system
discriminated against their clients on the basis of race. At the vortex of the
5:4 decision rejecting the use of statistics in appeals from condemned per-
sons was, once again, Thurgood Marshall's nemesis, Lewis F. Powell.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted a controversial criminal
justice issue for the first time: Does the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishment" prevent the state's use of capital
punishment? In Furman v. Georgia, the Court held, 5:4, that the imposi-
tion and the carrying out of the death penalty in Georgia in a "freakish"
manner constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. 14 Before Furman, Justice Powell observed in June of 1986,
9. Thurgood Marshall, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Second U.S. Judicial Circuit
(1986). Still another argument proffered by Marshall was the weakness of counsel appointed by the
court to represent defendants unable to afford an attorney. He stated, "Capital defendants frequently
suffer the consequences of having trial counsel who are ill-equipped to handle capital cases. Though
acting in good faith, many [defense attorneys] inevitably make very serious mistakes. Trial counsel's
lack of expertise takes a heavy toll."
10. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (1994) for an excel-
lent biography of Justice Powell.
11. See generally HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL (1996).
12. See, e.g., Powell's key fifth vote in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (affirmative action), Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (consensual homosexual rela-
tions) and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1986) (capital sentencing).
13. See infra at 45.
14. 408 U.S. at 310.
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"there was no rhyme or reason as to who got the death penalty and who
did not."15
Furman changed that state of affairs. All nine justices wrote separate
opinions in the case. More than 50,000 words were employed by the nine
brethren, making Furman the longest opinion ever written by the U.S. Su-
preme Court. 16 Three of the majority justices concluded that existing death
penalty statutes were unconstitutional because of the unconstitutional
vagueness of the statutes. Penal laws, wrote Justice William 0. Douglas,
had to be written in an "evenhanded, nonselective, and non arbitrary"
manner." Judges were "required" to make sure that these statutes were
"not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups."' 8
Justices William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Byron White, and
Potter Stewart, for different reasons, were the others who voted to invali-
date the Georgia capital sentencing legislation. Brennan and Marshall ar-
gued that the death penalty was morally wrong and that evolving standards
of decency in our society led to their conclusion that the death penalty was
per se unconstitutional.' 9
For Justices White and Stewart, the argument against the death pen-
alty took a different tack. For Stewart, the vagueness of death penalty stat-
utes made implementation of the death sentence as arbitrary as a person
being hit by lightening: A freakish capital sentencing system "is cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening is cruel and unu-
sual."2 For White, because of the existing vagaries of death penalty imple-
mentation, the threat of a death sentence no longer functioned as a
deterrent to criminals because there was "no meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not."'"
Although some thought, including Thurgood Marshall, that Furman
was the death knoll for capital punishment in America, "the decision had
the opposite effect. It galvanized state legislative support for the death
penalty, especially in the South. Within two years of the decision, over
thirty states had amended their statutes in an effort to address the concerns
expressed in Furman."22 Following Furman, Georgia enacted a new capital
sentencing statute that specified ten aggravating circumstances, at least one
15. With a few exceptions, all the internal Court letters, MT[C, etc., quoted in this paper have
come from the files of the late Justice Lewis F. Powell, located in the Archives of the Washington and
Lee University Law School, Lexington, Kentucky.
16. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 106-107 (1998).
17. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring); Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
22. David C. Baldus, George Woodsworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Weiner, and Barbara Brof-
fitt, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical & Legal Over-
view, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1649 (1998). The newly
enacted legislation specified the mitigating and aggravating factors that sentencing juries had to con-
sider when determining the punishment of the guilty defendant in a capital case.
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of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt
before a death sentence could be imposed. In part, the jurors had to assess
whether
[Tihe crime [was] committed in the course of another capi-
tal felony? Was it committed for money? Was it committed
upon a police officer or judicial officer? Was it committed
in a particularly heinous way or in a manner that endan-
gered the lives of many people? Did the defendant have a
record of prior convictions for capital offenses?23
In addition, the Georgia statute identified "mitigating" factors those
jurors had to take into account before reaching their sentencing decision.
These factors included the age of the defendant, extent of cooperation with
police, as well as the emotional or mental state of the defendant at the time
of the crime.24
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,25 the Court majority upheld the
Georgia death penalty statute as reformulated by the legislature after
Furman. The Court majority (Brennan and Marshall dissented) noted that,
Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the
death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected
group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be
guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would
focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and
the defendant. . . No longer can a jury wantonly and
freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circum-
scribed by the legislative guidelines. In addition, the review
function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords addi-
tional assurance that the concerns that prompted our deci-
sion in Furman are not present to any significant degree in
the Georgia procedure applied here.26
In his dissent, Marshall called the death penalty a "vestigial savagery"
that violated standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment.27 "What
disturbed him most," wrote observers, "was that several members of the
Court's majority approved retribution as a legitimate reason for imposing
the death penalty."28 Marshall addressed that reality in his dissent:
The taking of life "because the wrongdoer deserves it"
surely must fall, for such a punishment has as its very basis
23. Georgia Code 1933, § 27-2534.1 (current version GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2006)).
24. Id.
25. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
26. Id. at 206-07.
27. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 239 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. ROGER GOLDMAN AND DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 232
(1992).
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the total denial of the wrong-doer's dignity and worth
[which is the goal of the Eighth Amendment to respect].29
That same Term, the Court invalidated mandatory death sentence stat-
utes. Such legislation "depart[ed] markedly from contemporary standards
respecting the imposition of the punishment of death.
30
They did not recognize the jury's function in exercising its
discretion to provide 'particularized consideration of rele-
vant [mitigating and aggravating] aspects of the character
and record of each convicted defendant before the imposi-
tion on him of a sentence of death.'
31
In Godfrey v. Georgia,32 a 6:3 decision, the Court examined one statu-
tory aggravating factor of Georgia's capital sentencing system adopted af-
ter Gregg. It found that the provision was unconstitutionally broad and
vague as to violate the 8th and 14th Amendments and remanded the case
back to the state courts.3 3 In another case, the Court held that regardless
of the statutory aggravating factors, a state may not impose the death pen-
alty without a showing that the defendant had the "intent to kill."
34
McCleskey v. Kemp,35 handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court during
its 1986 Term, was a case involving the constitutionality of Georgia's ad-
ministration of its statutory capital sentencing process. Lawyers for the pe-
titioner, Warren McCleskey, an African-American, urged reversal of his
death sentence because the state's imposition of the death penalty violated
both the 8th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.36
The sentence of death by a state had to be imposed fairly and with a
reasonable, justifiable, consistency-not arbitrarily or capriciously. The
U.S. Supreme Court had said, in many cases after Furman and Gregg, that
the infliction of the death penalty required a high level of reliability, care,
and fairness far above those acceptable for less serious punishments.37
By the time of McCleskey, a more somber Marshall was hammering
away at the fact that the new procedural safeguards incorporated into the
new statutes after Furman were without value. There was still arbitrariness
29. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 353 n.4 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
33. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422. The aggravating factor stated that capital punishment was permit-
ted if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim."
34. Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-801 (1982).
35. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
36. Id.
37. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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and capriciousness in the administration of these new laws. A dispropor-
tionate number of African-American males were still put to death in the
states.
V. THE MCCLESKEY DEFENSE: THE BALDUS STATISTICAL ANALYSES
OF HOMICIDES IN GEORGIA, 1973-1979
By the time the McCleskey case was heard in the federal courts
(1983-1987), "a large body of research conducted on race and capital sen-
tencing indicated that the race of the victim is a significant factor linked to
imposition of the death penalty, with offenders convicted of killing White
persons more likely to be charged with capital murder (a prosecutorial de-
cision) and more likely to receive the death penalty (generally a jury deci-
sion) than offenders convicted of killing Black victims."38 One basic
purpose of such social statistical analysis
[I]s to ferret out causation when direct evidence is lacking.
Multivariate regression analysis seeks to determine the
causal influence of a variety of factors, all of which are un-
derstood to have an impact on a final result. It achieves this
by holding other variables constant, thus isolating the ef-
fects of the suspected variable. Statistical evidence can
never provide direct evidence of intent (or causation) in any
case. But a careful analysis based on a well-formulated
model can provide valid circumstantial evidence of
causation.39
The most exhaustive of these studies were the ones conducted by Pro-
fessor David Baldus and his associates.4" Baldus, a University of Iowa Law
School Professor, and his associates, had selected the State of Georgia for
the most comprehensive statistical examination of whether racial discrimi-
nation continued to infect that state's capital sentencing process after
Furman. Selecting that state was a natural choice. Historically, Georgia's
record of racial discrimination in the criminal justice area was well docu-
mented. Recently, Georgia's capital sentencing process had been ex-
amined and found constitutionally infirm in Furman (1972). However, in
1976, in Gregg, a Supreme Court majority validated significant changes in
the state's capital sentencing process."
Baldus and his associates examined over 2,400 Georgia homicide cases
from 1973 to 1979, attempting to account for as many as 230 non-racial
38. Cynthia Y.K. Lee, Race and the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing and Guilt
Attribution Studies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533, 537 (1998).
39. Evan Tsen Lee and Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Prosecutorial Discrimination
Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 Sup. CT. REV. 145, 156-57 (1998).
40. See generally DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODSWORTH, CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
41. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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variables that may have influenced the sentencing patterns they were ex-
amining which may, in turn, have led to the disparities they found between
white victim and black victim sentences. 42 They reviewed parole board
records, police reports and prison files and were thus able to classify over
400 specific characteristics these homicides exhibited.4 3 His studies "con-
trolled for every relevant variable other than race, which is why the study is
regarded as an exemplary piece of social science research."'44 His goal was:
"to take account of every variable that might have influenced which homi-
cide defendants ultimately received death sentences and, using exacting
mathematical analysis, to isolate exactly what role the illicit factor of race
played in Georgia's capital decision-making process.
45
Refining their efforts in a second study, holding constant for the 39
non-racial variables they believed most likely to play a role in capital sen-
tencing in Georgia, plus the race of the defendant and the race of the vic-
tim, Baldus concluded that murderers of white victims had 4.3 times
greater chance of being sentenced to death than murderers of black vic-
tims. "Murdering a white victim increases one's odds of being sentenced to
death by a factor of 4.3, while a prior conviction for armed robbery, rape,
or murder increases one's odds of being sentenced to death by a factor of
4.0," concluded Baldus. For Baldus and his associates, the race of the vic-
tim "emerged as the consistent and powerful factor."46 This finding was
statistically significant at the .005 level, "indicating that the likelihood that
this was a chance finding is 1 in 200. The generally accepted level of signifi-
cance is .05; when an association is likely to occur by chance only 1 out of
20 times, scientists will generally accept [.05] as proven. '47 Furthermore,
the Baldus study's use of a sophisticated multiple linear regression model
"found an association between race of victim and the death sentence that
was significant at the .001 level. There is only 1 chance in 1000 that this was
a random finding, unrelated to a real association between race and out-
come." 48 This "statistical link between race [of the victim] and capital sen-
tencing [was] far stronger than that between smoking and cancer or heart
disease. Two of the most powerful factors determining who was to be exe-
cuted in Georgia, the Baldus team consequently concluded, were the races
of the perpetrator and his or her victim."' 49 The data indicated that blacks
who killed whites were sentenced to death by juries in 22% of the cases ex-
amined, compared with whites who killed whites who were sentenced to
death by juries only 8% of the time. Juries sentenced whites who killed
42. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1397 (1988).
43. Id.
44. BALDUS, supra note 40, at 157.
45. LAZARUS. supra note 16, at 167.
46. Kennedy, supra note 42, at 1396.
47. Id.
48. Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 Am.
J.L. & MED. 335, 356, n.35 (1987).
49. Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies From the Per-
spective of Justice Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1044 (1994).
[VOL. 27:335
THE MCCLESKEY CASES
black victims to death only 3% of the time while other juries sentenced
blacks who killed black victims to death in only 1% of the cases.50
More importantly, Baldus found "race to be particularly important in
the charging decision made by prosecutors following a jury conviction for
murder. Prosecutors were many times more likely to seek the death pen-
alty in a case involving a white victim than a case involving a black victim.
These results were statistically significant after being subjected to a mul-
tivariate regression analysis."51
Prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving
black defendants and white victims; 32% in cases involving white defend-
ants and white victims; 15% of black and black cases and 19% on white
criminal-black victim cases.52 "The race of the victim, more than any other
factor, was the most significant factor influencing both the prosecutor's de-
cision to seek the death penalty and the jury's decision to impose a death
sentence.
53
The study also found that discretion was most pervasive in the middle
range of homicide cases. Racial disparities are the greatest, and the most
dramatic, in cases in between the least aggravated and the most aggravated
homicides. In the former,54 none of the defendants were sentenced to
death regardless of race, while in the most aggravated, heinous crimes,55
the majority of the defendants were sentenced to death, regardless of race.
Baldus testified at the federal district court habeas corpus hearing about
the high level of prosecutorial and juror discretion in the middle range of
homicide cases.
In the mid-range of cases the decision-makers have a real
choice as to what to do. If there's room for the exercise of
discretion, then the [race] factors begin to play a role....
Once the cases become quite aggravated, the death sentenc-
ing rate goes up quite high, but the disparities begin to de-
cline. [This is an example of what social researchers have
labeled] the liberation hypothesis [where] the exercise of
discretion is concentrated in the area where there's real
room for choice. The facts [in these mid-range cases] liber-
ate the decision maker to have a broader freedom for the
exercise of discretion, and it is in the context of these deci-
sions that you see the effects of arbitrary or possibly imper-
missible [racial] factors working.56
50. Id.
51. See BALDUS, supra note 40, at 148.
52. Ruth E. Friedman, Statistics and Death: The Conspicuous Role of Race Bias in the Adminis-
tration of the Death Penalty, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 75, 82 (1999).
53. Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 39, at 537.
54. These were, for example, barroom brawls that led to death or where, in a crime of passion, an
outraged husband killed his wife and her lover in his house.
55. These involved multiple murders, or, for example, a rape/torture/murder crime, etc.
56. Federal Trial Transcript at 36, 38-40, McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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One of Baldus's research associates also testified in the federal district
court proceeding, that "at Mr. McCleskey's [mid-range] level of aggrava-
tion, the average white victim case has approximately a 20 percentage point
higher risk of receiving the death sentence than a similarly situated black
victim case."
57
At another point in the evidentiary hearing, Baldus testified about the
disposition of ten cases involving the deaths of police officer victims in
Fulton County, Georgia, between 1973 and 1979. There were 18 offenders
associated with the ten homicides and 17 dispositions followed (one person
was mentally deranged and there was no disposition of the case).
Q: How many death sentences resulted from that number?
A: One.
Q: Who was that?
A: That was McCleskey...
Q: If you could take us through the disposition of these
cases.
A: Our analysis focused on the cases that we thought would
be, were most comparable to Warren McCleskey's. That
means that we wanted to look at cases where the defendant
was a trigger man, and the case also involved a serious con-
temporaneous offense .... We produced a pool of seven
cases in which there was a triggerman, who was also in-
volved in a serious contemporaneous offense, burglary,
armed robbery, and in one case the shooting of another per-
son in the course of the homicide .... Of these [seven of-
fenders, including McCleseky], three of them pled guilty to
murder and had no penalty trial following the guilty plea.
An additional two went to trial on murder charges and were
convicted and there was no penalty trial held thereafter.
Two other offenders went to trial on murder charges, and
they were found guilty and had a penalty trial. And of these
two penalty trials, my record shows that one received the
death sentence and one received a life sentence.
Q: And the death sentence was?
A: McCleskey's.
Q: What did you conclude from this analysis of the police
victim Homicide cases in Fulton County with respect to ra-
cial impact?
A: ... [T]he principal conclusion that one is left with is that
this death sentence ... is not consistent with the disposition
of cases involving police officer victims in this county ....
What we do know that there was nothing that looms in Mc-
Cleskey's record that would clearly distinguish his case from
these other cases. In a circumstance like that, it seems, it is
57. Id. at 40.
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my opinion that a racial factor could have been the consid-
eration that tipped the scale against McCleskey in his case. 58
Baldus's multivariate regression analyses clearly showed that "in a
substantial number of capital cases, the same result would not have oc-
curred but for the race of the victim. There was therefore a substantial
probability that McCleskey's sentence would not have been the same had
the race of his victim been different. '59 McCleskey's lawyers, in their brief
to the U.S. Supreme Court, wrote that "Professor Baldus demonstrated
that this 'dual system' of capital sentencing was fully at work in Fulton
County where petitioner had been tried and sentenced to death."6 °
Baldus's findings were fully supported by other social science re-
search.6" In February, 1990, the U.S. General Accounting Office published
Report Number GGD-90-57, entitled Death Penalty Sentencing: Research
Indicates Patterns of Racial Disparities. In the end, after careful screening
by GAO researchers, there was an examination of the findings of twenty-
eight major statistical studies on capital sentencing. The GAO found that
in 82% of the studies, the race of the victim influenced the likelihood of
being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty. The
GAO noted that this finding "was remarkably consistent across data sets,
states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques."62
VI. MCCLESKEY'S CASE IN THE GEORGIA AND LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS
Warren McCleskey was a young, habitual black criminal who was one
of four men arrested and convicted in the Superior Court of Fulton
County, Georgia of a May 13, 1978 armed robbery and murder of a white
policeman, Officer Frank Schlatt at the Dixie Furniture Store in Atlanta,
Georgia.63 A few weeks later, he was arrested in connection with another
armed robbery.64 He gave Atlanta police a statement confessing his partic-
ipation in the first robbery, but continually denying shooting Schlatt. On
October 12, 1978, a jury of eleven whites and one black sentenced him to
consecutive life imprisonment for the two armed robberies and to death for
58. Id. at 41-46.
59. Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 39, at 159-60.
60. Brief for Petitioner at 16, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1986) (No. 84-6811).
61. See SAMUEL MURROW & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL Dis-
PARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 66-69 (1989). In this statistical study of eight states that imple-
mented a post-Furman death penalty-Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, North Carolina,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Virginia-the researchers found in each state a statistically significant dis-
parity between killers of whites and killers of blacks, with killers of whites receiving the death penalty
at a much higher rate than killers of blacks. For example, they found that in the three states with the
highest number of death sentences-Georgia, Florida, and Illinois-killing a white victim increased the
odds of a death sentence by a factor of four in Illinois (3 times greater than for killing a black victim),
five in Florida (4.3 times greater than killing a black), and about seven in Georgia (7.2 times greater
than for the killing of a black victim).
62. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GGD-90-57.
63. McClesky [sic] v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 108-109 (1980).
64. Id. (At the time of his arrest, McCleskey had three prior convictions for armed robbery).
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the "malice murder" of Schlatt. The jury returned a verdict after finding
two aggravating factors and no mitigating circumstances, and recom-
mended a sentence of death.65
Carrying out Warren McCleskey's death sentence was delayed by the
NAACP's Inc. Fund lawyers' state appeals and post-conviction remedies.
By 1983, having exhausted all state avenues for redress, and having the
U.S. Supreme Court deny McCleskey's certiorari petition to review the
judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court,6 6 the lawyers filed for a petition
for habeas corpus in federal district court for the Northern District of
Georgia. Their argument: McCleskey was sentenced to death because
Georgia's capital sentencing system was "rife with racial discrimination.
There was a good chance, they argued, that he would have received life
imprisonment had he been white."67 Moreover, racial discrimination in
Georgia was pervasive, extending to differences in capital sentencing based
on the race of the victim. The Baldus study clearly showed that killers of
white victims were eleven times more likely to be sentenced to death than
those of blacks.6" The evidentiary hearing was held in the federal district
court in August, 1983.
The critical task of the NAACP lawyers, assuming that the judges ac-
cepted the validity of the Baldus study, was to link the strongly circumstan-
tial findings of racial discrimination to the protections afforded persons
under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment" and Fourteenth Amendment's "equal protection" clause. The
former claim was that Georgia's capital sentencing process was "adminis-
tered arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically in the State of Georgia." In
Furman, the Court majority held that any arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment.69 Given the Baldus findings, Mc-
Cleskey's lawyers concluded that the arbitrary discrimination against their
client denied him his constitutional right to be free from such cruel and
unusual punishment. McCleskey's "equal protection" claim maintained
that Georgia's imposition of its capital sentencing legislation 'is imposed
pursuant to a pattern and practice to discriminate on the grounds of
race."
70
The NAACP was attempting to make the circumstantial case on behalf
of McCleskey because the lawyers (and most social scientists) believed that
the Baldus data was so solid and "established a strong inferential case of
intentional discrimination by Georgia against McCleskey." Baldus's analy-
sis had shown a "clear pattern [of racial discrimination in capital sentenc-
ing] unexplainable on grounds other than race." These racial disparities in
sentencing accompanied by opportunities for both prosecutorial and jury
65. Id. at 115.
66. McCleskey v. Zant, cert.denied, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981).
67. Dorin, supra note 49, at 1043.
68. Baldus et al., supra note 22.
69. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
70. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 886 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
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discrimination were "a prima facie showing of denial of equal protection
exceeding every standard ever announced by the [U.S. Supreme] Court for
proof of discriminatory acts under the Equal Protection Clause."'"
Their brief noted that Georgia's "race-based decision-making" embod-
ied a "quintessential irrationality" that clearly violated "the mandate of
equal treatment embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment." McCleskey's
counsel concluded that the "odds were better than 50% that Officer
Schlatt's race had been the determinative factor in Warren McCleskey's
death sentence."72 In part, their brief cited the results of Baldus's research:
[Between 1973-1979] 2,484 murders and non-negligent man-
slaughters occurred in the State of Georgia. Approximately
1,665 of those involved black defendants; 819 involved white
defendants. Blacks were the victims of homicides in approx-
imately 61 percent of the cases, whites in 39 percent....
[Professor Baldus] found that the racial proportions were
heavily inverted. Among the 128 cases in which a death
sentence was imposed, 108 or 87% involved white vic-
tims .... [These cases] were nearly eleven times more likely
to receive a sentence of death than were black victim cases.
When the cases were further subdivided by race of defen-
dant, Professor Baldus discovered that 22 percent of black
defendants in Georgia who murdered whites were sentenced
to death, while scarcely 3 percent of white defendants who
murdered blacks faced a capital sentence.73
The second constitutional link advanced by the NAACP lawyers was
that between the data and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. Both Furman and Gregg, the lawyers ar-
gued, "stood for the proposition that capital punishment could never be
inflicted arbitrarily and capriciously. Yet, according to the [NAACP law-
yers], that is precisely what would happen if racism affected, in a pervasive
fashion, the selection of those who were to die."7 4
Georgia's basic counter-argument in the lower courts was to argue that
death penalty litigation was far different than grand and petit jury selection
and Title VII litigation that used social science statistics to make their case
on appeal. The federal district court held that the State of Georgia success-
fully rebutted the petitioner's arguments. The State's lawyers had success-
fully argued that the Baldus studies "were not the product of good
statistical methodology," and that "black-victim cases [were] left behind at
the life sentence and voluntary manslaughter stages [because they were]
71. Marina Miller and Jay Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of Juror-Victim Racial
Similarity, 105 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 159, 160 (1978).
72. Dorin, supra note 49, at 1048.
73. Brief for Petitioner at 11-12, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (No. 84-6811) (emphasis
added).
74. Dorin, supra note 49, at 1052.
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less aggravated and more mitigated than the white-victim cases." In its
brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, Georgia's lawyers argued:
[T]hat the evidence in the instant case shows that the Geor-
gia statutory scheme is functioning as it was intended to
function and that those cases which are more severe are re-
ceiving stronger penalties while the less severe cases are re-
ceiving lesser penalties. There is no evidence to show that
the Petitioner's sentence in the instant case was arbitrary or
capricious and no evidence to show that either the prosecu-
tor or the jury based their decision on race.75
The federal trial judge, District Judge J. Owen Forrester, rejected Mc-
Cleskey's claim on the ground that the Baldus Study did not represent, in
his view, "good statistical methodology." The study did not capture "every
nuance" of the state's capital sentencing process. He concluded that Mc-
Cleskey failed to make out a prima facie case "of purposeful discrimina-
tion" in sentencing based on either the race of the victim or the race of the
defendant.76
On appeal to the recently created Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
that court, sitting en banc affirmed the judgment of the district court by a
9:3 vote. Although the majority assumed the validity of the Baldus study,
they concluded that, for McCleskey to reverse his death sentence, he had to
produce evidence showing that his sentence was the consequence of racial
decision making.77 However, the Baldus study, concluded the majority,
"only showed that in a group involving blacks and whites, all of whose
cases are virtually the same, there would be more murderers of whites re-
ceiving the death penalty than murderers of blacks .. "78
The magnitude of the statistics cannot be called determinative in any
given case. While there is a race-of-the-victim relationship with the imposi-
tion of the death sentence discernible in enough cases to be statistically
significant in the system as a whole, no single petitioner could, on the basis
of these statistics alone, establish that he received the death sentence be-
cause, and only because, his victim was white.7 9
The majority concluded that there was no showing of discriminatory
intent in his case. As for the Baldus statistics, the majority concluded that
such evidence must be so strong that it compels a conclusion of discrimina-
tion.8" The Baldus study's showing of disparate impact in sentencing based
on the race of the victim, without more, was insufficient to invalidate Geor-
gia's capital sentencing system. McCleskey's lawyers had to show evidence
75. Brief for Respondent at 5-6, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1986) (No. 84-6811).
76. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 356 (D.C. Ga. 1984).
77. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 1985).
78. Id. at 895.
79. Id. at 896-97
80. Id. at 890 (citing Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1449 (11th Cir. 1983).
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that conclusively indicated that race was intentionally and purposefully be-
ing used in capital sentencing in the instant case. They court found that
they had presented no evidence that tended to support a conclusion that
the race of his victim in any way motivated a jury to impose the death
sentence in his case.81
Moreover, the Baldus study "revealed an essential rational system in
which high aggravation cases were more likely to result in the death sen-
tence than low aggravation cases. As one would expect in a rational sys-
tem, facts such as torture and multiple victims greatly increased the
likelihood of receiving the penalty."82 The majority noted that "aside from
statistics, [McCleskey] presents literally no evidence that might tend to sup-
port a conclusion that the race of [his] victim in any way motivated the jury
to impose the death sentence."83
The statistics cannot show that the race-of-the-victim factor
operated in a given case, even in the mid-range. Rather, the
statistics show that, on average, the race-of-the-victim factor
was more likely to affect the outcome in mid-range cases
than in those cases at the high and low ends of the spectrum
of aggravation. The statistics alone are insufficient to show
that McCleskey's sentence was determined by the race of
his victim, or even that the race of his victim contributed to
the imposition of the penalty in this case.84
VII. MCCLESKEY IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, 1986-1987
Going into the Supreme Court, the NAACP lawyers knew they
needed a fifth Justice to support their contentions. That meant that one of
the conservative jurists-Rehnquist, O'Connor, White, Scalia, or Powell-
had to be moved by the data to join the more moderate quartet, i.e., Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. The quartet forced the
Court to hear McCleskey. A law clerk who served during that Term recal-
led that "clerks in other conservative chambers shared [Powell's law
clerk's] sense of helplessness [in trying to change her boss's mind on the
issue of race discrimination and death]. 85
A number of them were impressed with the Baldus study
and tried to get their bosses to give it careful attention. Sev-
eral clerks, even one of Rehnquist's, suggested that the
Court appoint a special master, an independent expert, to
81. See id. at 898.
82. Baldus et al., supra note 22.
83. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 898.
84. Id.
85. This behind-the-scenes account is based on materials available in the Thurgood Marshall
Papers at the Library of Congress.
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give the mathematically challenged Justices a neutral assess-
ment of Baldus's methods and findings. The conservative
Justices would have none of it, though.86
From the beginning to the end of the McCleskey case in the Supreme
Court, there was no change in the Court's lineup. Four wanted the Court
to accept the data regarding the close relationship between race and capital
sentencing. Five were very hostile to the petitioner and to his arguments
that were based solely on statistical correlation. Certiorari was granted on
June 26, 1986, because there were four votes to grant: Associate Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. However, there were five who
voted to deny certiorari: Chief Justice Burger (who, only two days after the
grant of certiorari in McCleskey, informed the Reagan White House that
he planned to leave the Court at the end of the Term), and Associate Jus-
tices Powell, White, O'Connor, and Rehnquist.
After oral argument, held on October 15, 1986, and the Conference
Session that followed almost immediately afterwards, October 17, 1986, the
votes remained the same. And when the decision came down in April,
1987, it was still a 5:4 vote, with the majority opinion written by Justice
Powell.
A. The Briefs on the Merits Filed by the Parties
The NAACP's Inc. Fund lawyers presented two different equal protec-
tion theories in their brief on the merits. Both were based, the lawyers
claimed, on the findings in the Baldus Report. The first was the race-of-
the-defendant argument. It posited that the race of the defendant improp-
erly influenced Georgia prosecutors and jurors. Second was the race-of-
the-victim argument, where it was maintained that sentencing was improp-
erly influenced by the race of the victim. In both arguments, they main-
tained that purposeful discrimination was present and that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibited such purposeful racial
discrimination.
They had to make that argument because the Court had said in earlier
cases that only purposeful discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause. McCleskey's lawyers had to show that,
literally, the prosecutors were "out to get" him. Unless racial disparities
were quite extraordinary, such as found by earlier Courts in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins87 and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,88 the Court, on the basis of statisti-
cal data alone, would not infer discriminatory behavior by the State in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
86. Id.
87. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
88. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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B. The Serious Concerns Voiced in Chambers
First of all, the statistical "comfort level" of most of the jurists who
heard the case, from the U.S. District Court to the U.S. Supreme Court was
quite abysmal.89 Justice Powell, who authored the majority opinion in the
case, wrote his law clerk, Leslie Gielow: "My understanding of statistical
analysis, particularly what is called 'regression analysis[,]' ranges from lim-
ited to zero."9 For the Court majority, the statistics, assuming their valid-
ity, were of no significance from a legal standpoint.
Justice Powell's Memo to the Conference (MTTC) at the time of the
granting of certiorari in late June, 1986, reflects his initial concerns about
the case. These were to remain in his mind and in the minds of his four
colleagues, and became the basis for the majority's rejection of the discrim-
inatory inferences the Baldus study made regarding racial discrimination in
capital sentencing in Georgia.
First of all, the Baldus study "did not detect any appreciable disparity
based on the race of the defendant; the only claim of discrimination is based
on the disparity that assertedly derives from the race of the victim." From
Powell's perspective, McCleskey did not even have standing to raise the
latter claim because the disparity involved Black victims, not Black
defendants!
Second, McCleskey had to show more than discriminatory impact in
order to prevail under the 14th Amendment. Specifically, he must show
facts that support an inference of discriminatory intent or motive. 91 In or-
der to prevail under the Eighth Amendment, petitioner must prove "that
the race factor was operating in the system in such a pervasive manner that
it could fairly be said that the system was irrational, arbitrary, and
capricious."92
That proof was not present. In fact, Powell shared the view that
Baldus's evidence presented here "confirms rather than condemns the sys-
tem" - the study showed no discrimination as to the race of the defen-
dant.93 He explained his vote to deny certiorari because the statistical data
does not show race-based decision-making. Because the "[the Eleventh
Circuit] thoroughly analyzed this case and decided it correctly, I see no
need for review here.
94
He continued to voice such concern in the months leading up to the
oral arguments in McCleskey, scheduled for mid-October, 1986. In notes to
his law clerk working on the case, Leslie Gielow, in Memos to the File, and
89. Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress.
90. See supra note 15. The following discussion is derived from Justice Powell's Memo to the
Conference.
91. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279-80.
92. See McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 891.
93. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 290.
94. Justice Lewis Powell, Memo to the Conference. June 1986. Memo on file with Washington &
Lee University Law School.
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in MTTC's to his colleagues, he shared his thoughts and received their
inputs.
As early as September 16, 1986, Powell wrote his law clerk that "can-
dor compels me to say that my strongly held tentative view is to affirm
CAll." 95 He, along with Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor, saw the case
"as an attack on capital punishment itself. In a multiracial society like the
United States, the petitioner and amici are saying that judges and juries,
lawfully qualified, cannot decide capital cases fairly. It will not be easy for
me to accept this view."
96
By the end of September, in a memo to the file, Powell was venting his
fears about the impact of a reversal of the Eleventh Circuit. "Apart from
the reliability of what can and cannot be 'proved' by statistics, the argu-
ment made in McCleskey would be difficult to limit to capital cases. If
similar statistics were produced, the rationale of McCleskey's argument
would apply to all crimes. ' '9 Blacks "were not the only 'minorities' in our
country," he wrote.98
In a lengthy bench memo to her "boss," Leslie Gielow reinforced Pow-
ell's concerns about the consequences of a reversal of the Eleventh Circuit
and provided Powell with additional arguments for him to possibly use in
conference. First, she wrote, quickly assume the validity of the Baldus
study (as the Eleventh Circuit did) and then address petitioner's constitu-
tional claims. If the Georgia sentencing system survives [constitutional]
analysis, there is no need to examine the validity of the statistics. If it does
not, then a remand to the Eleventh Circuit to address the validity of the
studies is appropriate.
In a footnote at this point in her memo, she wrote: "The experience of
this country with race discrimination, especially in Georgia, makes the
Baldus results believable .... Race-based attitudes, conscious and uncon-
scious, remain. It is entirely plausible that despite admonitions and jury
selection safeguards, the individuals on a jury could value white life more
than black life." 99
Therefore, her suggested strategy for Powell was identical to that used
by the Eleventh Circuit majority: assume the statistical validity and imme-
diately examine the constitutional claims. Once the constitutional questions
are raised, given the past decisions of the Court, it would be easy to affirm
the federal appeals court judgment. She first questioned whether McCles-
key even had standing to sue. As he is not a black victim, he cannot "allege
95. Justice Lewis Powell, Memo to Leslie Gielow. September 16, 1986. Memo on file with Wash-
ington & Lee University Law School.
96. Id.
97. Justice Lewis Powell, Memo to the File. September 1986. Memo on file with Washington &
Lee University Law School.
98. Id.




that he suffers injury because he is a member of a protected class." 100
However, she then wrote, even if he has standing,
[T]he Baldus study is not sufficient to establish an equal
protection violation. 'Proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.' Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan
Housing Authority, 429 U.S. 737, 1977. Statistics may tend
to demonstrate intent, but 'absent a pattern as stark as that
in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative,
and the Court must look to other evidence.' 01
She then addressed Powell's major fear: "A final problem with Equal
Protection theory is its limitless application."'01 2 There are many studies
that show "race-based effects at all levels of the criminal justice process. "103
If the Court were to accept statistical proof in McCleskey's case, then all
kinds of defendants "could challenge the operation of the system. Opening
the door to these types of challenges (based on, for example, alienage, sex,
illegitimacy) could threaten the entire operation of the criminal justice
system." 04
Regarding McCleskey's Eighth Amendment claim, she noted that his
"real claim is that juries systematically undervalue black life."105 However,
while that may be true of black victims, Baldus's studies reveal that "de-
fendants are not suffering punishment because of their race."106 Her clos-
ing recommendation to Powell was to strongly affirm the action of the
Eleventh Circuit.
At the time Gielow presented her bench memo to Powell, one of
Thurgood Marshall's clerks, Eben Moglen, gave his much more liberal boss
a different kind of bench memo. For the clerk, the critical question for the
justices opposed to Powell's position was whether McCleskey "was entitled
to relief from his death sentence upon his statistical showing that the sys-
tem of capital punishment in Georgia discriminates against blacks and the
killers of whites in violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments.'
0 7
Raising this question, he wrote to Marshall, will "require the Court to





104. Id. (Powell absolutely agreed with her; scribbling "yes!" next to that part of her paragraph).
105. Leslie Gielow, Memo to Justice Lewis Powell. Memo on file with Washington & Lee Univer-
sity Law School.
106. Id.
107. Eben Moglen, Memo to Justice Thurgood Marshall. Memo on file with Washington & Lee
University Law School.
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racially discriminatory fashion."' 8 He noted that "our best hope for suc-
cess lies in highlighting that question to the fullest extent possible, and re-
quiring the Court to face up to its implications.' °9 He urged Marshall "to
support a resolution of this case on an Equal Protection theory, and one
which will, I think, allow us to make the best possible use of the study's
extraordinarily thorough data to support conclusions which the Court will
have to acknowledge.
110
Sadly he acknowledged that, "if we had the votes behind us," we could
"simply order relief."' 1 In frustration, he wrote that some agency of gov-
ernment had to "show how the death penalty, at least in Georgia, is racist
in a way which the American people have so far not understood. It is pre-
cisely that ignorance, as you said in Gregg, which prevents American soci-
ety from sweeping the death penalty away once and for all."'11
At the end, he said: "I don't want to hold out much hope that we're
going to prevail. I think a loss is very likely indeed, but I think if we choose
our ground right, we have some running room, and we should be able to
make a real fight of it. The more we can force the Court to face the racial
implications of an affirmance here, the better off we are." ' 3
It is clear, examining the McCleskey documents that circulated in Pow-
ell's chambers, that he and his clerks were very aware of the racial discrimi-
nation in Georgia's capital sentencing process. They were, however, much
more concerned about the onset of a sort of anarchy in the American crim-
inal justice system if there was a reversal of the Eleventh Circuit's judg-
ment in McCleskey.
C. The Oral Arguments and the McCleskey Discussions in Conference
Oral argument was scheduled for October 15, 1986. Powell was, as
always, prepared for these engagements. He had jotted down no less than
nine questions he was going to ask McCleskey's lawyer. They focused on
the concerns he had from the very beginning of the Court's involvement
with the case. "Was there any proof of an intent to discriminate? Facts are
relevant to intent to discriminate," he wrote. 14 Further he questioned,
Can general statistics prove intent to discriminate, in view of
no facts? What about similar cases in other states? Is the
challenge based on the stats intended to invalidate all con-






113. Eben Moglen, Memo to Justice Thurgood Marshall. Memo on file with Washington & Lee
University Law School.
114. Justice Lewis Powell, Notes on McCleskey Oral Argument. Notes on file with the Author.
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victim white? Will Gregg remain good law except where the
defendant is black and the victim is white?
115
At 9:00 a.m., just an hour before the Justices entered the courtroom to
hear oral arguments in McCleskey, Justice White handed Powell (and the
other three conservative justices, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia) a 12-
page memo explaining why White would affirm the decision of the Elev-
enth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. This was an unprecedented action, for
generally these lengthy memos began circulating among the justices after
the oral argument and the initial vote on the case.
In the memo, White noted that the federal trial judge, who received a
B.S. from Georgia Tech, did an excellent job of ripping the Baldus study's
methodology to shreds and that the Eleventh Circuit's judgment was cor-
rect. Further, as White's law clerk observed, the NAACP's claims on be-
half of the petitioner "cut no ice" for his boss.116 As Powell had earlier
remarked, White too believed that the Baldus data showed that the Geor-
gia capital sentencing system, as it was implemented, was a rational one.
Baldus, concluded the White note to Powell,
... has, in fact, shown that the system operates in a predict-
able and largely rational fashion. Because of this fact, Mc-
Cleskey should be held to the burden of showing that in his
case the race of the victim factor influenced the imposition
of his death sentence. . . . Because McCleskey has offered
no further evidence in support of his claim, the judgment of
CAll should be affirmed.117
Powell quickly read the memo and then joined his colleagues to hear
and participate in the oral argument. It was a tough hour of questions and
answers, especially for the NAACP Inc. Fund Lawyer who faced the Court,
John Charles Boger.
He began his presentation with the following observation: "the color
of a defendant's skin ... or that of his victim, is often as grave an aggravat-
ing circumstance in Georgia ... as those expressly designated by Georgia's
legislature."'1 8 After a brief, uninterrupted review of the Baldus data and
its relationship to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments, Bo-
ger began to receive hard questions from the justices.
Q: Do [you] not have to show intentional discrimination
against this particular defendant?
115. Id.
116. Justice Byron R. White, Memo to the Conservative Justices. October 15, 1986. Memo on file
with Washington & Lee University Law School.
117. Id.
118. Transcript of Oral Argument, McCleskey v. Kemp, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/
1980-1989/1986/198684 6811/argument/
20081
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
A: Yes, I believe he does, Your Honor, and yet I believe
that we have shown that in this case. We've had to show it
inferentially, of course. Juries in Georgia deliberate in se-
cret, and there are no records kept; and prosecutors rarely
confess their own-
Q: . . . Are there [capital] cases involving a constitutional
violation where the Court has relied on statistical proof of
the type you're suggesting we use here?
A: [I]n some cases the evidence of historical fact plus statis-
tics may be all that does exist.
Q: (Justice O'Connor) It's such a curious case, because
what's the remedy? Is it to execute more people [for killing
Black victims]?
A: Well, no...
Q: Do you want the Court to provide, then, abolition of the
death penalty altogether?
A: Well, no...
Q: (Chief Justice Rehnquist) Well, Mr. Boger, don't you
have to show that this particular jury discriminated?
A: Your Honor, I think we have shown that it's more likely
than not that this jury did.
Q: Well, this particular jury was only convened once. And I
think you have to show under our cases that this particular
jury would have dealt differently with a black defendant
who killed a black person.
A: ... We of course don't have confessions from the jurors
themselves. No one has come forward.
Q: (Justice Scalia) Wasn't the shot which the police officer
suffered, in the head, was at very close range, indicating that
there was a conscious attempt to kill the man?
A: There certainly appeared to have been at least a flurry of
shots toward the officer. I don't believe it was at close
range....
Q: (Justice O'Connor) Well, at bottom the claim being
made here is a curious one .... You come forward with a
claim that says, in effect, not enough people- the death
penalty is not being imposed on enough people.' 19
This is a sampling of some of the tough and hostile questions peppered
at the NAACP lawyer by the conservative quintet. The atmosphere, and




the questioning, was quite different when Georgia's Assistant Attorneys
General, Ms. Mary Beth Westmoreland, took her place at the lectern.
Her arguments followed the state's arguments in the lower courts.
The data was not trustworthy and, without any proof presented of a specific
intent to purposefully discriminate by the prosecutor and by the jurors, the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were invalid. Then the ques-
tions came. Here is a sampling:
Q: May I ask you [whether this] is not a mid-range case?
A: Your Honor, I do not agree that it's a mid range case. I
think the facts of this case certainly supported the death
penalty. And I think it is a most aggravated case.
Q: (Justice Brennan) [I]f we disagreed with the legal conclu-
sions of the Court of Appeals, would we not have to send it
back to the Court of Appeals and say, well, let's find out if
you're right about the study or your opponents are right
about the study?
A: Your Honor, that's obviously one possible alternative.
We would submit that the record is so clear on this point
that it is obvious that no intention discrimination has been
shown.
Q: (Justice Blackmun) Out of some 1,500 black victim cases,
there are a total of 20 death sentencesFalse And out of a
total of about 970 white victim cases there are over 100
death sentences.
A: That's correct as well, Your Honor.
Q: And you say all of that is explained by the fact that the
white victim cases are consistently the more serious?
A: That's correct, your Honor; that's our submission, that in
examining these cases, out of the black victim cases I be-
lieve you'll find perhaps over a thousand occur in something
like a family dispute, a lover dispute, a fight involving liquor
of some sort.... And, for whatever reason, frequently more
times we'll see torture cases involving white victim cases
than you do in black victim cases. ...
Q: Can statistical evidence be relied upon at all to establish
intentional discrimination, in your view?
A: This case ... does not lend itself readily to the type of
analysis used here, the multiple regression type of
analysis.... 120
120. Transcript of Oral Argument, McCleskey v. Kemp, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/
1980-1989/1986/19868468111argument/.
2008]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
D. The Great Fear of the Majority: The "Slippery Slope"
"McCleskey's claim," wrote Powell to his conservative colleagues after
oral argument, "taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question
the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system."'' If the
Court accepted them, it "could soon be faced with similar claims to other
types of penalty" from members of other groups claiming discrimination.122
He feared that future social science research would show other "unex-
plained discrepancies" in sentencing patterns that might necessitate orders
calling for the complete restructuring of the criminal sentencing process.123
The secret conference session took place two days after the oral arguments,
on October 17, 1986. It is in these conference sessions that, in addition to
other business, all the justices discuss the cases heard earlier in the week.
The Chief starts the discussion followed by the Associate Justices, from the
most senior to the newest member of the Court.
McCleskey v. Kemp, Number 84-6811 on the Court's Docket sheet,
was called and Chief Justice Rehnquist gave his views. He would affirm
the Eleventh Circuit judgment. "If we reverse, this [action] would invali-
date the Georgia capital sentencing statute as well as jeopardize other
criminal statutes."'1
24
Each jury, the Chief said, "decides only the case before it. There is no
reason to assume a different jury would discriminate. Furthermore,"
Rehnquist maintained, "there is absolutely no support for the petitioner's
claim of racial discrimination against the prosecutor."' 25 He assumed that
the Baldus statistics were accurate but believed strongly that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims of the petitioner were groundless be-
cause there was no proof presented of actual, purposeful discrimination by
either the jury or the prosecutor.
The senior Associate Justice, William J. Brennan, spoke next. He dis-
agreed with Rehnquist and voted to reverse the Eleventh Circuit. Brennan
believed that the "Baldus research made a strong inference of discrimina-
tion by both prosecutors and juries. The findings clearly show a disparate
impact as well." '126 "The Georgia capital sentencing system," Brennan ar-
gued, "violates both the 8th and 14th Amendments because Baldus's find-
ings make it more likely than not that the race of the victim and of the
defendant is a determinative factor. There is in Georgia," he said, "an un-
acceptable risk of discrimination. Reversal," he concluded, "would not
121. Justice Lewis Powell, Memo to the Conservative Justices. Memo on file with Washington &
Lee University Law School.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Transcript of Judicial Conference, October 17, 1986. On
file with Washington & Lee University Law School.
125. Id.
126. Justice William J. Brennan, Transcript of Judicial Conference. October 17, 1986. On file with
Washington & Lee University Law School.
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open up the possibility of further legal action invalidating a host of criminal
statutes."'
1 27
Justice White spoke next. Powell knew his position because he had
digested White's memo by this time. He would affirm the Eleventh Circuit
because "the Baldus findings are not enough to make out a facial violation
of the 8th and 14th Amendments." '128 The study, he said, "finds discrimina-
tion in the 'middle range' but (supporting the contention of Ms. Westmore-
land) there was no showing that McCleskey's case falls within a middle
range."'1 29 For White, there was "no showing that the death sentence in
McCleskey's case was imposed arbitrarily."13
Thurgood Marshall, the Court's first African-American Justice, spoke
next. Joining Brennan, he would reverse the Eleventh Circuit. He re-
counted, for his colleagues sitting around the table, the many occasions
where he had to deal with the blatant racial discrimination he experienced
in all criminal justice trials in the South when the defendant was black.
"Clearly," jotted Powell in his notes "TM talked about the discrimination
historically imposed on Blacks."' 31 Justice Blackmun, next to discuss the
case, initially passed. However, a few minutes later, he said he would re-
verse on the basis of the arguments Justice Stevens made earlier in the
conference.
Powell was the next to speak. Before he entered the conference ses-
sion he had sketched out his arguments for affirmance of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit judgment. The petitioner, said Powell to his colleagues, "relies solely
on statistics to prove both the 8th and 14th Amendment violations." How-
ever, he insisted (using italics to emphasize the next point), "criminal cases
should not be decided on the basis of statistics alone. They may be vulnera-
ble and therefore untrustworthy, as the district court held. But I would
assume, as did the CAll, the general validity of the study and address the
constitutional questions." '32 Turning to the 14th Amendment matter, Pow-
ell said that, "under Arlington Heights, an intent to discriminate must be
shown. And it was not shown here! At least on the facts of this case, we
cannot infer intent to discriminate based on race.,
133
He also rejected the petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim. "Since
Gregg, our decisions have further minimized the risks of arbitrary decisions
by juries, prosecutors, and judges.' 1 34 Powell maintained that "under our
criminal justice system juries must have some discretion. But the jurors are
127. Id.
128. Justice Byron White, Transcript of Judicial Conference, October 17, 1986. On file with Wash-
ington & Lee University Law School.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Justice Lewis Powell, Notes from Judicial Conference, October 17, 1986. Notes on file with
Washington & Lee University Law School.
132. Justice Lewis Powell, Transcript of Judicial Conference, October 17, 1986. On file with Wash-
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controlled by the Rules of Evidence, the arguments permitted and jury in-
structions. ' 135 McCleskey, Powell said,
..is attacking the jury system. If we agreed with McCles-
key, we would have to overrule Gregg and its progeny (no
less than seven cases since 1976), end the imposition of the
death penalty, the use of statistics could not be limited to
blacks and to capital cases. All minorities and women would
use statistics to challenge and invalidate criminal statutes
and other penalties present in these state statutes!"'
1 36
Justice John Paul Stevens, appointed by President Ford in 1975 to re-
place the retired liberal Justice, William 0. Douglas, spoke next, and would
reverse on both 8th and 14th Amendment grounds: "Most of the capital
cases come from the South where at least in the recent past the lives of
Blacks were not valued as highly as that of Whites.' 1 37 While he said that
the petitioner "cannot prove willful intent to discriminate in a particular
case, the [Baldus study] is sufficient to show that with regard to a particular
class of cases (the mid-range category), race is likely to be relevant."' 38
Stevens believed the Eleventh Circuit opinion was "wholly unsatisfactory"
and he would reverse it.
1 39
The first woman to serve on the Supreme Court, Sandra Day
O'Connor, was next. "For reasons stated by Powell she would affirm the
CAll. ' 14° She said: "Our cases since Gregg have restricted the reliance on
aggravating factors and opened up the range of mitigating factors" for ju-
ries to consider. However, "jury discretion is essential. 1 4 ' Addressing
Stevens' observations, she ruefully remarked that "there is no way to limit
the consequences of what John suggests. ' 142 Once you open the gates by
allowing statistics to overturn death sentence convictions, then the entire
criminal justice system is in jeopardy. As to the constitutional arguments,
she argued that "McCleskey lacks standing as to the 14th Amendment and
if we accepted his 8th Amendment claim, this would [she reiterated] open




137. Justice John Paul Stevens, Transcript of Judicial Conference, October 17, 1986. On file with
Washington & Lee University Law School.
138. Id.
139. Id. (Blackmun joined the Stevens argument in the conference session.)
140. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Transcript of Judicial Conference, October 17, 1986. On file
with Washington & Lee University Law School. Justice O'Connor spoke often about how moved she
was by Marshall's discussions of the horrible experiences he had trying to defend black defendants in
sham criminal trials in the South. Although she might have been moved to tears, she never considered







Antonin "Nino" Scalia, the freshman Justice, spoke last. He would
affirm the Eleventh Circuit judgment before the Court. According to Pow-
ell's notes, Scalia "was not surprised by the statistics."' 44 For Scalia stated,
"we (judges) can't do anything more than try to guide the jury. We simply
cannot abandon the discretion of the jury in particular cases. 145
Rehnquist then tallied up the vote recorded on his docket sheet and
formally announced that the Court majority's position was to affirm, 5:4,
the Eleventh Circuit. As Chief, he had the power to assign the opinion-
writing to himself or someone else in the majority. In McCleskey he as-
signed the critical majority opinion-writing task to Justice Lewis F. Powell.
E. Crafting the McCleskey Opinion for the Court
In less than a month, on November 13, 1986, Powell circulated the first
of eight separate, different, and improved drafts of the majority's opinion.
Each new version took into account the comments and concerns of the
others who had joined the majority. By the time he circulated his fourth
draft, he had received "join me" letters from his four colleagues. a4 6 After
holding his majority, Powell's last four drafts were directed at addressing
the criticisms of the majority's views that were found in the dissenting opin-
ions being circulated to all the justices between January and late April,
1987.
Before Powell circulated his first draft, he received a great deal of help
from the law clerk in his office who had been working on McCleskey since
the petition was received in chambers. In a November 1, 1986 note to
Gielow, Powell wrote that the dissenters "will argue that such discrimina-
tion may be 'inferred' from the Baldus statistics," McCleskey "makes no
claim that the jury in his case was improperly constituted or that it had
discriminatory intent.
147
Gielow and another law clerk drafted a second opinion and, on No-
vember 13, Powell circulated his first formal daft of the majority opinion to
all the justices. That same day, he received a hand-written note from Jus-
tice O'Connor. She said: "You have written a splendid opinion in McCles-
key. No one could have done better. You grappled fairly and
appropriately with all aspects. We owe you our thanks. Sandra."' 48 She
joined the opinion the very next day. A few days later, Rehnquist joined as
well, requesting only a minor modification. Then, on November 19th,
White joined, also suggesting only a slight modification in Powell's opinion.
Finally, on February 27, 1987, the fifth justice, Scalia, joined. Powell had
144. Justice Antonin Scalia, Transcript of Judicial Conference, October 17, 1986. On file with
Washington & Lee University Law School.
145. Id.
146. Scalia was the last of the quartet to sign on; he "joined" Powell's opinion on February 27,
1987.
147. Justice Lewis Powell, Memo to Leslie Gielow. November 1, 1986. Memo on file at Washing-
ton & Lee University Law School.
148. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Memo to Lewis Powell. November 13, 1986. Memo on file at
Washington & Lee University Law School.
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successfully kept the majority together. Now the Court had to await the
dissenters' final versions of their dissenting opinions.
Brennan, the senior Justice in dissent, wrote a note to the other three
dissenters shortly after the conference discussion and vote: "I expect there
will be considerable writing in this case. I intend to try something of my
own, but leave to you whether you also will be writing dissents." '14 9 After
Powell's first draft was received by the other eight jurists, Brennan's MTTC
informed the Court that he was "undertak[ing] a dissent. I expect it may
take me a little longer than I'd like, but I hope you will bear with me. I
regard this as an especially important case. "150 He subsequently wrote
three drafts, his final dissent finished in mid-April, 1987. Blackmun and
Marshall joined Brennan's dissent.
Blackmun's mid-December MTTC informed all that he too would be
"writing a little bit in this one in due course. ' 151 He was to write four
versions of his dissent, the final one circulated on April 20, 1987. Stevens
and Brennan joined his dissent. Stevens wrote a third dissenting opinion in
McCleskey. He wrote three versions, the last one circulated in early April.
It was joined by Marshall and Blackmun.
Two days after Blackmun circulated his final dissenting opinion, on
April 22, 1987, McCleskey v. Kemp was announced by Justice Powell in
open court.
F. The Scalia Memorandum of January 6, 1987
On January 6, 1987, during the opinion-writing phase-where the fur
often flies-the newest Justice, Antonin Scalia, sent a short MTTC. It was
sent after Scalia had read two drafts of the majority opinion written by
Powell. It was the first of many shocking and dramatic actions Scalia has
taken during his tenure on the high bench. It must be quoted in its entirety
because of the clear message he communicated to his colleagues concern-
ing his beliefs about racism in America.
I plan to join Lewis's opinion in this case, with two reservations. I
disagree with the argument that the inferences that can be drawn from the
Baldus study are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is
unique, or by the large number of variables at issue. And I do not share
the view, implicit in the [draft] opinion, that an effect of racial factors upon
sentencing, if it could only be shown by sufficiently strong statistical evi-
dence, would require reversal. Since it is my view that the unconscious
operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon
149. Justice William Brennan, Memo to the Dissent. Memo on file at Washington & Lee Univer-
sity Law School.
150. Id.
151. Justice Harry Blackmun, Memo to the Conference. December 1986. Memo on file at Wash-
ington & Lee University Law School.
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jury deliberations and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowl-
edged in the decisions of his court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say
that all I need is more proof. Sincerely, Nino.
152
It was clear that Scalia agreed with the petitioner that racial bias in
capital sentencing was present. He understood and accepted Baldus's find-
ings. Scalia, however, disagreed with petitioner's remedial recommenda-
tions because he also believed that these were "ineradicable racial
sympathies and antipathies.
153
VIII. THE COURT'S REJECTION OF MCCLESKEY'S
STATISTICS ARGUMENT
Powell's opinion for the five-person majority pretty much followed the
appellate court's equal protection analysis. Like the Eleventh Circuit
judges, Powell assumed the validity of the Baldus Study findings. Powell
also agreed with the lower federal court that there was no conclusive evi-
dence presented showing that either the Georgia prosecutor or the jurors
had purposefully discriminated against McCleskey. The majority con-
cluded that sophisticated statistics, standing alone, could not establish that
race was a factor in capital sentencing. The Court would "demand excep-
tionally clear proof' before inferring that the discretion had been
abused. 54 The Baldus correlations, he concluded, had not crossed the "ex-
ceptionally clear proof" standard. Nor, he believed, could they ever do so
with statistics alone. It seemed that no matter how powerful, statistics
could never prove causation in a particular case. "155
Because they rejected the Baldus findings, they rejected the constitu-
tional (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment) arguments presented by the
petitioner's lawyers. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion claim, Powell said that,
A defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has
the burden of proving 'the existence of purposeful discrimi-
nation' and that [it] 'had a discriminatory effect' on him. ....
[Petitioner] offers no evidence specific to his own case that
would support an inference that racial considerations played
a part in his sentence. . . . [The Baldus statistics are not,
standing alone], sufficient proof of racial discrimination.
156
The majority also rejected McCleskey's Eighth Amendment claim:
"McCleskey cannot argue successfully that his sentence is 'disproportionate
152. Justice Antonin Scalia, Memo to the Conference. January 6, 1987. Memo on file at Washing-
ton & Lee University Law School.
153. Id.
154. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
155. See id. at 280.
156. Id. at 292-93.
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to the crime in the traditional sense.'" 5 7 The fact that there exist discre-
tionary stages in the capital sentencing process "is not determinative of the
issues before us."' 58 He then closed the argument by stating that the Court
"lawfully may presume that McCleskey's death sentence was not wantonly
and freakishly imposed and thus the sentence is not disproportionate
within any recognized meaning under the 8th Amendment."' 59 He again
wrote that "statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular
factor entered into some decisions. ,160
These capital sentencing decisions were not amenable to statistical
analysis because of the variety of actors involved in capital sentencing
(prosecutors, jurors, judges, advocates) and because of the unique charac-
teristics of the criminal defendant and the crime itself. In the implementa-
tion of capital sentencing statutes since Gregg, discretion must always be
present and the statistics presented by the defendant were insufficient to
show an abuse of discretion in his case. Without hard evidence, the "smok-
ing gun," showing purposeful racial discrimination, there was no violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, he cautioned,
Our assumption that the Baldus Study is statistically valid
does not include the assumption that the study shows that
racial considerations actually enter into any sentencing deci-
sions in Georgia. At most, [it] indicates a discrepancy that
appears to correlate with race. . . . Even a sophisticated
multiple regression analysis such as the Baldus Study can
only demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into
some capital sentencing decisions. 6
McCleskey was required to "prove that the decision makers in this
case acted with discriminatory purpose."' 62 And that proof was not
presented to the Court. McCleskey failed to make a prima facie case that
racial discrimination had permeated Georgia's capital punishment process
in his case. "Despite his having presented the most sophisticated and com-
prehensive study ever attempted of the interaction between race and capi-
tal punishment in a state's criminal system,"' 63 the majority concluded that
statistics alone were not enough. There was no empirical or anecdotal evi-
dence of willful, intentional, racial discrimination presented in McCleskey's
case. As a matter of law, said Powell, even sophisticated multivariable re-
gression analysis is inadequate to prove purposeful discrimination.164
157. Id. at 306 (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984).
158. Id. at 307.
159. Id. at 308 (citations omitted).
160. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308.
161. Id. at 292 n.7.
162. Id. at 279.
163. Dorn, supra note 49, at 1038.
164. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 n.7.
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"Even widespread statistical differences will not in themselves estab-
lish an 'unacceptable risk' that racist discretion was present.1 65 The dispari-
ties uncovered by the researchers were not problematic for the quintet.
Powell wrote that "apparent discrepancies in sentencing are an inevitable
part of our criminal justice system. Where the discretion that is fundamen-
tal to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is
unexplained is invidious." '166
The McCleskey majority, assuming the validity of the
Baldus data, concluded that black defendants in Georgia
"must simply commit the worst crimes, which must also dis-
proportionally victimize whites. To assume [otherwise]
would imply that some influence such as racism was at
work." '16 7 The racially-skewed numbers presented by the
NAACP lawyers "could not possibly indicate racism. The
disparities ... were explained away by unknown factors in-
herent in a necessarily discretionary [capital sentencing
process]. 168
Powell's opinion addressed the major concern shared by the majority
(except for Scalia), the one that greatly frightened them:
McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. If
we accepted [his] claim that racial bias had impermissibly tainted the capi-
tal sentencing decision, we would soon be faced with similar claims as to
other types of penalty.
169
Powell's opinion made crystal clear to advocates and the legal profes-
sion generally that a criminal defendant who appeals his death sentence
could establish a 14th Amendment violation "only by scrutinizing the deci-
sion-makers in his case and offering 'exceptionally clear proof' of abuse." 170
The Court determined that the Baldus Study indicating that the death pen-
alty in the State of Georgia was imposed more often on Black defendants
and killers of White victims did not establish that any of the decision-mak-
ing in the defendant's case acted with discriminatory purpose in violation
of the equal protection clause; and the Baldus study at most indicated a
discrepancy that appeared to correlate with race which was not a constitu-
tionally significant risk of racial bias affecting Georgia's capital sentencing
system such that it violated the Eighth Amendment.17
165. Friedman, supra note 52, at 83.
166. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
167. Friedman, supra note 53, at 84.
168. Id. at 85.
169. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-15.
170. Friedman, supra note 53, at 85.
171. See generally McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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A. The Dissenting Opinions: Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens
Brennan's dissent, joined by his friend Thurgood Marshall, and by Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens for the most part, blasted the illogic of the
Powell opinion. It focused solely on the Eighth Amendment claim.
(Blackmun's dissent examined the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion argument). He also noted that while the Baldus data could not prove
that racial bias infected the jury that sentenced him to death, they did
"demonstrate a substantial risk of such infection and it was precisely that
risk of unfairness that the Court's earlier death penalty cases had sought to
eliminate." '172
McCleskey, he began, "demonstrated precisely the type of risk of irra-
tionality in sentencing that we have consistently condemned in our 8th
Amendment jurisprudence."' 73 The Baldus findings cannot be said to con-
clude 'to a moral certainty' that race influenced a decision; "we can identify
only 'a likelihood' that a particular factor entered into some decisions, and
a 'discrepancy' that appears to correlate with race. This 'likelihood' and
'discrepancy,' holds the Court, is insufficient to establish a constitutional
violation." '74
Instead, there is the new demand for clear, demonstrable proof that
race discrimination was present in the capital sentencing process, thereby
making the sentence of death haphazard and arbitrary. This is a change for
in the past defendants "never have had to prove that impermissible consid-
erations have actually infected sentencing decisions. We have required in-
stead that they establish that the system under which they were sentenced
posed a significant risk of such an occurrence. "175
Equally unsettling was the fact that "the Court accepts the statistics as
valid and [also] that McCleskey had demonstrated a risk that racial
prejudice plays a role in capital sentencing in Ga. Nonetheless, it finds the
probability of prejudice insufficient to create constitutional concern. "176
However, for Brennan, any careful analysis of the statistics "reveals that
the risk that race influenced McCleskey's sentence is intolerable by any
imaginable standard.
177
For the dissenters, Baldus's data "relentlessly documents the risk that
McCleskey's sentence was influenced by racial considerations."' 178 Accom-
panying the statistical data, there is the reality of Georgia's sorry history of
racial discrimination against blacks. There is, said Brennan, a continuing
"specter of race discrimination" that has been recognized by the Court.' 79
"It would be unrealistic to ignore the influence of history in assessing the
172. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 322.
175. Id. at 324.
176. Id. at 324.
177. Id.
178. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 330.
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plausible implications of McCleskey's evidence. History and its continuing
legacy thus buttress the probative force of McCleskey's statistics."' 180
Regarding the great fear held by Powell and others, Brennan wrote:
"To reject McCleskey's claim because of the Court's 'fear that [his] claim is
an invitation to descend a slippery slope .... is to ignore both the qualita-
tively different character of the death penalty and the particular repug-
nance of racial discrimination. . . The Court's projection of apocalyptic
consequences for criminal sentencing" he sadly concluded, "is greatly
exaggerated.
181
For Blackmun, "McCleskey has demonstrated a clear pattern of differ-
ential treatment according to race that is inexplicable on grounds other
than race." '82 His dissent focused on the Equal Protection claim of the
petitionner and it blasted Powell's opinion from that legal perspective.
Blackmun was a recent convert to Brennan and Marshall's side in the
capital sentencing issue. His initial views on this constitutional issue, as well
as the validity of social statistics, were voiced when he was still a federal
appeals court judge. In a 1968 case, Maxwell v. Bishop, he wrote that
"whatever suspicion [statistical studies] may arouse with respect to south-
ern interracial rape trials as a group over a long period of time, we feel that
the statistical argument does nothing to destroy the integrity of Maxwell's
trial. These studies," he added, "were, however, interesting and provoca-
tive." '183 After he joined the Court in 1970, Blackmun was one of the four
dissenters in the Furman case. He wrote, in part, that these capital sentenc-
ing cases, "Provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to no
one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the
death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral
judgment by finite minds." '184
Yet he dissented in Furman because he believed that the five whose
judgments ended capital punishment as it was practiced in 1972 had "ex-
propriated" the authority vested in the elected branches of government.
By 1987, he had changed his position on capital punishment radically. His
dissent, joined by Stevens and Marshall and by Brennan for the most part,
focused on the 14th Amendment's "Equal Protection" Clause. The Court
majority, he concluded, changed the guidelines for determining whether a
petitioner has been denied equal protection of the law. Under existing, but
not employed standards, McCleskey met the three-factor standard, he
wrote,
First, he must establish that he is a member of a group that
is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment. Second, he must make a showing of a substantial
180. Id. at 334.
181. Id. at 341-42.
182. Id. at 361 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
183. 398 F.2d 138, 147 (8th Cir. 1968).
184. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972).
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degree of differential treatment. Third, he must establish
that the allegedly discriminatory procedure is susceptible to
abuse or is not racially neutral.
1 1
5
Unlike his colleagues in the majority, Blackmun concluded that "there
can be no dispute that McCleskey has made the requisite showing" under
all three prongs of the standard."8 6
For Blackmun, as well as all the dissenters, "the most disturbing as-
pect" of the majority opinion was its insistence that "granting relief to Mc-
Cleskey... could lead to further constitutional challenges. That, of course,
is no reason to deny McCleseky of his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause."' 87 (After his retirement, Blackmun publicly urged the abolition of
capital punishment because it was "cruel and unusual punishment" prohib-
ited by the Eighth Amendment).
Justice John P. Stevens wrote a short dissent, one that presented his
solution to the problem of racial discrimination in the capital sentencing
process. Like the other dissenters, he concluded that the Baldus studies
"demonstrate a strong probability that McCleskey's sentencing jury, which
expressed the 'community's outrage,' was influenced by the fact that Mc-
Cleskey is black and his victim was white, and that this same outrage would
not have been generated if he had killed a member of his own race. This
sort of disparity is constitutionally intolerable."' 8
He rejected the fear that anarchy would ensue in the criminal justice
system if the Court accepted Baldus's results and either overturned the
CAll or sent the case back to that court for further action. "The Court's
decision appears to be based on a fear that the acceptance of McCleskey's
claim would sound the death knell for capital punishment. . . . But the
Court's fear is unfounded."'8 9
Stevens then suggested the following remedy: "If Georgia were to nar-
row the class of death-eligible defendants to those categories [extremely
serious crimes], the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of
the death penalty would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated.' '190
Only Blackmun joined Stevens' dissent.
After the 1987 decision, McCleskey's attorney filed a second petition
arguing that his client's 6th Amendment right was violated when Georgia
placed an informant in the cell next to McCleskey. This led to the produc-
tion of a 20-page police report that was never turned over to the defense.
The federal district court judge granted the petition, agreeing that McCles-
key's 6th Amendment rights were violated. The lCA reversed the district
185. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 353.
187. Id. at 365.
188. Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 367.
190. Id. at 367.
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court and the defense filed a certiorari petition with the U.S. Supreme
Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, heard the case and ruled against
him. Justice Kennedy, for a six person majority, wrote that a second
habeas corpus petition had to be denied unless there were "exceptional
circumstances" that warranted the habeas grant.
Marshall wrote a blistering dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens. At one point in the draft dissent, Marshall labeled the majority's
action "lawless," but was persuaded by Justice Stevens to remove that
word. He wrote Marshall that it would be "prudent to make the change."
Marshall removed the term, writing to Stevens that he took the word out
"within a minute of receiving your note. '191
Just days before his scheduled execution, McCleskey's lawyers filed a
third petition with the Court. This time the Court denied certiorari. Mar-
shall's dissent from the denial was a very bitter one.
In the final hours of his life, he alleges that he was denied an
impartial clemency hearing. In refusing to grant a stay to
review fully McCleskey's claims, the Court values expedi-
ency over human life. Repeatedly denying Warren McCles-
key his constitutional rights is unacceptable. Executing him
is inexcusable."'1 92
McCleskey was executed on September 25, 1991. Less than one week
later, Marshall retired. He was an angry jurist, chagrined that he had not
been able to convince his colleagues of the reality of racial discrimination
in criminal justice cases, especially capital sentencing situations.
Additionally, a few days before McCleskey's execution, an anguished,
retired, Lewis F. Powell, the author of the majority opinion in McCleskey I
told his biographer that he would have changed his vote in that case. It was
not because Powell, in 1991, accepted the argument from statistics.
"No, I would vote the other way in any capital case."
"In any capital case?"
"Yes."
"Even in Furman v. Georgia?"
"Yes. I have come to think that capital punishment should
be abolished. It serves no useful purpose. It brings dis-
credit on the whole legal system. The sentence upheld by
the Supreme Court [in McCleskey] and adopted by more
than thirty states can't be or isn't fairly carried out. "
1 9 3
191. Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress.
192. Id.
193. JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 451-52.
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Of course, it was too late for McCleskey. And one can only imagine
how Thurgood Marshall reacted when he read Powell's recantation in the
WASHINGTON POST.
More unfortunately, Powell's 1986 conclusions on the questions of law
raised by McCleskey's lawyers still remain binding precedent for American
society. "For the first time," wrote a scholar, the 1986 majority "required a
capital defendant to prove that his particular sentence was based on imper-
missible factors." 194 In reality, this standard is one that is nearly impossible
to realize in the real world of state and local criminal justice systems.
IX. CAPITAL SENTENCING AFTER MCCLESKEY
Does the race of the victim matter in capital sentencing? According to
all significant studies on this question, all collected and analyzed in the
1990 GAO Report, it most assuredly does matter. However, a five person
Court majority rejected decades of research findings that answered the
question in the affirmative.
Their judgment in McCleskey "largely eliminated the federal courts as
a forum for the consideration of statistically based claims of racial discrimi-
nation in capital sentencing."'1 95 It is still strong precedent more than a
decade later. Between 1987 and 2000, it has been cited as controlling pre-
cedent by Supreme Court majorities almost eighty times.
Immediately after the Court's announcement of McCleskey, the de-
nunciations were quick to appear in print. A Pulitzer Prize winning Court
commentator wrote that the Court had "effectively condoned the expres-
sion of racism in a profound aspect of our law."'1 96 McCleskey was com-
pared to prior "self-inflicted" wounds by the Court in racial discrimination
cases such as Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and
Korematsu v. U.S. (1944).197 The Harvard Law Review concluded that Mc-
Cleskey was "logically unsound, morally reprehensible, and legally unsup-
portable. ' 19 8 Constitutional scholars such as Harvard Law School's
Randall Kennedy concluded that McCleskey "repressed the truth and vali-
dated racially oppressive official conduct." 199
In McCleskey, the Court majority evidently "chose self-consciously to
prefer the evils revealed by the Baldus studies to those that they believed
would be set loose by ruling differently."20 Perhaps they did not believe
the reality of racial discrimination that the Baldus study laid out. In any
event, the conservative quintet sent an emphatic message to the legal com-
munity about the very limited validity of statistical data in death penalty
cases.
194. Note, The Supreme Court-1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 149, 155 (1987).
195. Baldus, et al., supra note 11, at 1734.
196. Anthony Lewis, Bowing To Racism, N.Y. TiMES, April 28, 1987.
197. Hugh Bedau, Someday McCleskey Will Be Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A. TIMES, May 1,
1987.
198. Note, supra note 194, at 158.
199. Kennedy, supra note 42 at 1389.
200. Id. at 1413.
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The message was, clearly, that a showing of disparate impact by statis-
tical data alone, would not be sufficient to uphold a 14th Amendment claim
of racial discrimination. It was an extremely cautious, frightened, and
blinded five person majority, except for Scalia, that had to reject the find-
ings of social statistics presented in the case.
Another shocking message for minorities after the majority spoke in
McCleskey, even without an awareness of the Scalia memo, was that Afri-
can American lives were dramatically undervalued in Georgia (and in most
other Southern states). The majority decision, said one scholar, "shows an
egregious disregard for the sensibilities of black Americans."2 1 Others
have written that the decision "reflects the fact that society as a whole cares
less about Black victims than White victims and devalues Black victims'
lives."2 °2 And for the old, tired warrior, Thurgood Marshall, the McCles-
key decisions were "inexcusable."203 On January 24, 1993, little more than
two years after Warren McCleskey was executed, the ever-frustrated, re-
tired, Justice Marshall passed away.
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